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DUN & BRADSTREET, INC. v. GREENMOSS BUILDERS,
INC.: THE SUPREME COURT FURTHER
MUDDIES THE DEFAMATION WATERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The first amendment protects free speech. Defamation law provides
compensation for injuries to reputation. When the threat of having to
pay that compensation hinders free speech, the two areas of law collide.
The United States Supreme Court recognized this conflict when it
first thrust the Constitution into defamation law over twenty years ago in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.1 In New York Times, the Court invoked
first amendment principles to make it more difficult for public officials to
recover for defamation. At that time, the common law of defamation
was a morass of archaic rules based on distinctions precipitated by historic accident.2 Cases following New York Times resulted in further constitutional encroachment on the common law by making recovery
equally as difficult for public figures3 and, finally, private individuals
when a matter of public concern was involved.4 Constitutional defamation law evolved into as big a quagmire as the common law.
Because much of the common law had been supplanted through extension of New York Times to private individuals, the Court became concerned that it had intruded too far on the states' authority to regulate
defamation laws. Thus, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' the Court began
to retreat. However, it did not allow a complete reemergence of common-law defamation principles. Instead, it formulated new rules to apply when private individuals are defamed.6
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,7 the Court

retreated even further, leaving private individuals defamed by speech not
involving a matter of public concern firmly entrenched in the common
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 108-32.
3. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See infra text accompanying
notes 14042 for a discussion of Curtis.
4. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See infra text accompanying
notes 143-45 for a discussion of Rosenbloom.
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See infra text accompanying notes 146-66 for a discussion of
Gertz.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 156-66.
7. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
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law bog. If Gertz is viewed as the first step in turning defamation law
back to the states, the result in Greenmoss is not surprising. The route by
which the plurality reached its result, however, is. This Note will challenge the plurality's success in distinguishing Greenmoss from Gertz and
its wisdom in reviving the "matter of public concern" test8 as a threshold
for triggering the Gertz requirements. Additionally, this Note will propose a simplified defamation law framework designed to strike a workable balance between free speech and reputation interests.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

The Facts

On July 26, 1976, Dun & Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, sent
a report to five of its subscribers stating that Greenmoss Builders (Greenmoss), a construction contractor, had voluntarily filed for bankruptcy. 9
The report was not only false but a gross misrepresentation of Greenmoss' financial condition.' ° That same day Greenmoss' bank informed
Greenmoss' president that it had received the report."

The president

immediately called Dun & Bradstreet's regional office and requested a
correction. 12 He also requested the names of the other subscribers who
had received the report so that he could personally be sure that they were
3
made aware of the error.1
About a week later, upon verifying that the report was false, Dun &
Bradstreet issued a corrective statement to the five subscribers involved.' 4 It refused, however, to reveal to Greenmoss the names of the
firms that bad received the report. 5 Greenmoss, dissatisfied with the
corrective measures taken by Dun & Bradstreet, brought a defamation
action in Vermont state court alleging injury to reputation 16 and seeking
8. See infra text accompanying notes 143-45.
9. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2941 (1985).
10. Id. The error resulted when one of Dun & Bradstreet's employees, a 17-year-old high
school student paid to review Vermont bankruptcy pleadings, mistakenly reported that Greenmoss had filed a petition for bankruptcy, when, in fact, it was one of Greenmoss' former employees who had filed the petition. Although it was routine for Dun & Bradstreet to verify the
accuracy of such reports with the businesses involved, it did not do so before distributing the
Greenmoss report. Id. at 2942.
11. Id. at 2941.
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2942.
16. Greenmoss claimed the damages which resulted from Dun & Bradstreet's report were

a damaged business reputation, lost profits, and loss of money expended to correct the error.

DUN & BRADSTREET

November 1986]

presumed17 and punitive damages.' 8

The jury found in favor of Greenmoss and awarded $50,000 in presumed and $300,000 in punitive damages.1 9 Dun & Bradstreet moved
for a new trial, arguing that under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.20 presumed and punitive damages were not recoverable unless the plaintiff

showed knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.21 It argued that the jury instructions had permitted an award of such damages
based on a lesser standard. 22 The trial court granted a new trial but the
Vermont Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the rule of Gertz did
not apply to a private plaintiff who had been defamed by a non-media
defendant.2 3
B.

The Supreme Court Decision

1. The plurality opinion
Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court in a plurality
opinion in which Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined. The
Court held that when defamation against a private person did not involve
a matter of public concern, presumed and punitive damages could be

awarded even absent a showing of" 'actual malice' "24 and that Dun 25&
Bradstreet's credit report did not involve a matter of public concern.
The Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the state
courts as to when the protections of Gertz apply. 26 The seeds of the con-

Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 69, 461 A.2d 414; 415 (1983),
aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 113-19.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 120-21. Greenmoss based its claim for punitive
damages on the grounds that Dun & Bradstreet's conduct was insulting, reckless and in total
disregard of Greenmoss' rights. Greenmoss Builders v. Dun & Bradstreet, 143 Vt. at 79, 461
A.2d at 420.
19. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2942.
20. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
21. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2942.
22. Id.
23. Id. The Vermont Supreme Court held that "the balance between a private plaintiff's
right to recover presumed and punitive damages without a showing of special fault and the
First Amendment rights of 'nonmedia' speakers 'must be struck in favor of the private plaintiff
defamed by a nonmedia defendant.'" Id. (quoting Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 75, 461 A.2d 414, 418 (1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985)).
24. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2946 (1985).
25. Id. at 2947.
26. Id. at 2942. The Court contrasted Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982), Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn.
1980), Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978) and Harley-Davidson Motorsports,
Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977), in which courts found Gertz inapplicable
to private figure suits against nonmedia defendants, with Antwerp Diamond Exch. v. Better
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flict were planted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 7 where the Court
for the first time imposed first amendment limitations on state defamation law. The conflict ripened in the Gertz decision ten years later. 28
In New York Times, the Supreme Court recognized that the first
amendment protected freedom of expression on issues of public interest
and that "'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open.. . ."" To protect this freedom of expression from the chilling effect of state libel laws, the New York Times Court held that a public official could recover damages for defamation only by proving that
"the false statement was made with actual malice - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.. . ."' The Court extended the actual malice requirement to libels
of public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,31 a case that also involved a public issue.32 Additionally, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,3 3 the Court applied the New York Times protections to any plaintiff
as long as the defamatory remarks involved "'a matter of public or general interest.' ,114 However, in Gertz the Court retreated from Rosenbloom by expressly limiting the New York Times protections to
defamations of public officials and figures."
Writing for the plurality in Greenmoss, Justice Powell noted that the
Gertz Court applied a balancing test by weighing first amendment concerns against the legitimate state interest of compensating individuals for
injury to reputation.3 6 Because of the type of speech usually involved in
the defamation of public officials and figures, the first amendment concerns outweighed a limited state interest.3 7 When the libel concerned a
Business Bureau, 130 Ariz. 523, 637 P.2d 733 (1981) and Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md.
580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976), in which the courts found Gertz applicable in such suits. Greenmoss,
105 S.Ct. at 2942.
27. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2943-44.
29. Id. at 2943 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270) (emphasis added by Greenmoss
Court).
30. Id. (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280). See infra text accompanying notes
133-39 for a discussion of New York Times.
31. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See infra text accompanying notes 140-42 for a discussion of
Curtis.
32. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2943.
33. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See infra text accompanying notes 143-45 for a discussion of
Rosenbloom.
34. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2943-44 (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44).
35. Id. at 2944. See infra text accompanying notes 146-66 for a discussion of Gertz.
36. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2944-45.
37. Id. at 2944. See infra text accompanying notes 149-52 for a discussion of why the
Gertz Court concluded the state interest was limited when a public figure or public official was
the plaintiff.
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private person, however, the Gertz Court found the state to have a
stronger interest. Because private persons did not voluntarily expose
themselves to an increased risk of defamation and had less access to
channels for rebutting false statements than did public officials and
figures, first amendment concerns diminished.3 8
In an attempt to reach an accommodation between the competing
state and first amendment interests, Justice Powell noted that the Gertz
Court placed a limitation on damages. It held that a state could not
allow recovery of presumed or punitive damages without showing actual
malice.3 9 Although the Gertz Court did not unequivocally limit this prohibition to matters of public concern, Justice Powell concluded that
nothing in the Gertz decision "indicated that this same balance would be
struck regardless of the type of speech involved."''4 He argued that because Gertz was decided in the context of public speech, its holding could
not be automatically applied to cases involving private speech.4 1
Justice Powell concluded that the Gertz requirement of showing actual malice to recover presumed and punitive damages applied only to
defamatory statements of public concern. The plurality reasoned that
the first amendment did not protect all speech equally. Only speech regarding "'matters of public concern' . . . is 'at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection.' "42 While speech involving public issues demanded full first amendment protection, "speech on matters of purely
private concern [was] of less First Amendment concern."4 3 Justice Powell concluded that the Constitution's role in regulating state libel law was
limited when matters of public concern were not involved."
According to Justice Powell, when the type of speech involved deserves less constitutional protection, the state's interest becomes more
significant.4 " He noted that under the common law of defamation, damages were presumed because though the defamatory statement certainly
resulted in serious harm, proof of actual damage was often impossible.4 6
The plurality reasoned that this rule of presumed damages "further[ed]
the state interest in providing remedies for defamation by insuring that
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2944.
Id.
Id.
Id. at n.4.
Id. at 2945 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
Id. at 2946.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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those remedies [were] effective." 4 7 Justice Powell concluded that because
speech of private concern deserved less constitutional protection, the
state interest supported the award of presumed and punitive damages
without the necessity of showing actual malice.4 8
The plurality next addressed whether Dun & Bradstreet's credit report involved. a matter of public concern.4 9 Justice Powell concluded
that it did not because it was speech that only interested the speaker and
its limited business audience." He noted that because the report had
such limited distribution, it could not be said to have contributed greatly
to the "'free flow of commercial information.' "s' The plurality further
reasoned that the type of speech involved, solely motivated by profit, was
unlikely to be deterred by "incidental state regulation." 52 Finally, the
market's demand for accurate credit reports decreased the significance of
the "'chilling' " effect caused by the threat of libel suits. 3
In sum, the plurality concluded that because defamation of private
persons not involving a matter of public concern was less deserving of
first amendment protections, the Gertz standard requiring a showing of
actual malice to recover presumed and punitive damages did not apply.
Because the credit report had only a limited audience, was solely motivated by profit, and was unlikely to be chilled by the threat of libel suits,
the plurality concluded it did not involve a matter of public concern.
2.

Concurring opinions

Chief Justice Burger and Justice White each filed a separate concurring opinion. 4 Chief Justice Burger repeated the belief he had expressed
in his Gertz dissent that defamation law involving private individuals be
left to evolve in the states regardless of the type of speech involved.55
Although he conceded that Gertz was "the law of the land" and must be
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2947.
50. Id. The Court argued that this interest did not warrant special protection because it
was false and clearly damaging to the victim's business reputation. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)). Under the terms of their subscription agreement, the Dun & Bradstreet subscribers who received the report could not distribute it to anyone else. Id.
52. Id. The Court reasoned that speech solely motivated by profit was less likely to be
deterred than speech not so motivated. Id.
53. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2948.
54. Id.
55. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger argued that the Court in Gertz had
"'embark[ed] on a new doctrinal theory which [had] no jurisprudential ancestry.'"
ger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).

Id. (Bur-
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followed in appropriate cases," he agreed with the plurality that Gertz
was inapplicable to a defamation that did not involve a matter 8of public
concern. 7 He urged, however, that the Court overrule Gertz.1
Justice White took the position that not only was Gertz erroneously
decided, but so was New York Times v. Sullivan. He argued that in considering the competing interests of a fully informed public and a defamation victim's right to vindication, the Court in New York Times had
struck an improper balance.5 9 He reasoned that first amendment values
protecting the flow of information necessary to make informed choices
concerning self-government were not served by circulating false statements about public officials. 6" Because of the difficulty in overcoming the
New York Times actual malice standard, these false statements were
likely to go uncorrected, leaving the public misinformed.6 By leaving
the lie uncorrected, the New York Times rule left the public official without a remedy for damage to reputation even though the protection of
one's good name was a basic consideration of our constitutional system.62
The New York Times rule, he concluded, fostered both pollution of the
stream of public information and destruction of the reputation and professional lives of defeated plaintiffs by falsehoods that might have been
corrected had reasonable efforts been made to verify the facts.63
Instead of increasing the plaintiff's burden in New York Times to a
nearly impossible level, Justice White suggested a better solution to balance the competing interests: the Court should have retained the common-law standard of liability' but limited the recoverable damages to a
level that would not have unjustifiably threatened the press. 65 He rea56. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
57. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
58. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
59. Id. at 2950 (White, J., concurring).
60. Id. (White, J., concurring).
61. Id. (White,J., concurring). Justice White pointed out that if a public official could not
prove knowing or reckless falsehood, a burden very difficult to meet, his complaint would be
dismissed and there would be no jury verdict of any kind in his favor, even if the publication in
question was admittedly false. Therefore, the lie would stand and the public would continue to
be misinformed. Id. (White, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 2951 (White, J., concurring). Justice White explained that protecting one's
name reflected" 'our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.'" Id. (White, J., concurring)
(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341).
63. Id. (White, J., concurring).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 114-27 for an explanation of the common-law standard of liability. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text for a proposed negligence
standard of liability for all defamation plaintiffs.
65. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2952 (White, J., concurring). To limit recoverable damages,
Justice White suggested that punitive damages could have been monitored or entirely forbid-
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soned that such an approach would result in allowing public officials,
upon proving the falsity of a statement, to vindicate their reputations and
correct the misinformation. 66 He concluded that "both First Amendment and reputational interests would have been far better served" by
such an approach .6 7 Reasoning that the Court had "undervalued the
reputational interest at stake in such cases," Justice White argued that
the common-law rules should have been retained for private
defamation.6 8
Justice White agreed with the dissent that no distinction could be
drawn between media and non-media defendants.6 9 He explained that
the first amendment did not protect media defamation defendants anymore than anyone else exercising their freedom of speech.7 0 To make
such a distinction in defamation cases would make no sense because it
would give the most protection to defendants that reached the most readers thereby polluting the communication channels with the most misinformation and causing the most damage. 7
Additionally, Justice White recognized that the plurality had not
addressed the question of whether the Gertz fault requirement would also
be inapplicable to defamations that did not involve a matter of public
concern." He concluded that if the Gertz rule regarding the recovery of
presumed and punitive damages was inapplicable in such cases, the requirement of finding some kind of fault on the part of the defendant must
be inapplicable also.7 3 Therefore, defendants in such cases would be
strictly liable for defaming private plaintiffs unless protected by a comden. He also suggested that presumed damages could have been eliminated or limited as in
Gertz. Id. (White, J., concurring). For a description of a bill currently before the House Judiciary Committee that closely resembles Justice White's idea, see infra note 224 and accompanying text.

66. Id. (White, J., concurring).
67. Id. (White, J., concurring).
68. Id. (White, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring).
70. Id. (White, J., concurring). Justice White cited Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965)
and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) as cases where the Court had applied the New
York Times rule to non-media defendants. He also cited First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978) (press does not have a monopoly on the first amendment or the ability to enlighten)
and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (press has no independent first amendment right of
access to prisons) to support his proposition that the media is not entitled to any special first
amendment protections. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2953 n.4 (White, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring).
72. For a discussion of the Gertz fault requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 156-

57.
73. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring). Justice White made this conclusion without offering any support. For a discussion of why he is probably correct, see infra

text accompanying notes 193-98.
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mon-law privilege or the defense of truth.7 4
Justice White argued that the press would be no worse off financially
if the common-law rules of defamation applied and the judiciary kept
damages under control.7 5 He noted how expensive it was to defend a
defamation suit even if damages were not ultimately recovered.7 6 He
also argued that the threat of libel suits would not intimidate a successful
and powerful press into withholding news it reasonably believed to be
true.7 7
Ultimately, Justice White agreed that Gertz did not apply to the case
at bar because Gertz should be overruled, and the defamatory publicacredit report, did not involve a matter of public
tion, Greenmoss'
78
concern.
3. The dissent
Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens joined. 79 The dissent argued
that to the extent it deterred truthful speech, all libel law involved first
amendment values.80 Under the first amendment, any restraint on
speech must be "narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate government
74. See infra text accompanying notes 122-27. Although this would not leave all defamation of private individuals to the common law as Justice White suggests (see supra text accompanying note 68), at least the first amendment would no longer be involved in defamations that
did not involve a matter of public concern. In his view, this would be a step in the right
direction.
75. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring).
76. Id. (White, J., concurring). To illustrate the expense of defamation litigation, Justice
White noted the long and complicated discovery in which plaintiffs must engage to meet their
burden of proof. Plaintiffs must investigate the workings of the press, including how a news
story is developed and, after Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), the state of mind of the
reporter and publisher. Justice White suggested that "the press would be no worse off financially if the common-law rules were to apply and if the judiciary was careful to insist that
damages awards be kept within bounds." Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring). He also suggested that a legislative solution to the damages problem might be appropriate. Id. (White, J., concurring).
77. Id. (White, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 2953-54 (White, J., concurring). Justice White offered no argument in support
of these conclusions.
79. Id. at 2954 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2955 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan compared defamation law to
state efforts to control obscenity (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)), ensure loyalty
(citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)), protect consumers (citing Virginia State Bd.of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)), oversee professions
(citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S.Ct. 2265 (1985)) "or pursue other
public welfare goals through content-based regulation of speech." Id. at 2955-56 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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interest.""1 Justice Brennan concluded that recovery of presumed and

punitive damages in libel actions failed to meet first amendment standards even in private defamations 8 2 In Gertz, Justice Brennan reasoned,

the Court restricted defamation plaintiffs who did not prove knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual
injury. This standard provided adequate protection of the legitimate
state interest involved.8 3
The dissent conceded that when the defamatory statement criticized

a private party, states enjoyed a great deal of leeway to compensate for
actual damage to the individual's reputation.

4

The dissent concluded,

however, that "[t]he requirement of narrowly tailored regulatory measures ... always mandates at least a showing of fault and proscribes the
award of presumed and punitive damages on less than a showing of actual malice."8 5 Justice Brennan argued that this approach struck the best
balance between the guarantee of free speech and the states' interest in
protecting reputation.8 6
According to the dissent, there was no question that for an award of

actual damages, Greenmoss must establish the standard of fault articulated by the Court in Gertz.

7

The only issue presented was whether

Greenmoss had to meet the Gertz requirement of showing actual malice
to be awarded presumed and punitive damages.88 Agreeing with Justice
White, Justice Brennan stated that the applicability of Gertz could not be
based on whether the alleged defamation was by a media defendant.8 9
81. Id. at 2956 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Lowe v. SEC, 105 S.Ct. 2557, 2586
(1985) (White, J., concurring)).
82. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Justice Brennan explained, the Gertz Court reasoned
that authorizing presumed damages allowed juries to award unpredictable amounts which bore
no relation to actual injury. In addition, punitive damages were found by the Gertz Court to be
irrelevant to the state interest because they did not compensate for actual injury. As a result,
the Gertz Court concluded that the award of presumed and punitive damages in defamation
cases without showing actual malice was not narrowly tailored to protect a legitimate state
interest and was, therefore, an unnecessary inhibition of the "vigorous exercise of First
Amendment freedoms." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349).
84. Id. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Gertz fault requirement, see infra
text accompanying notes 156-57.
88. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2957 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See infra text accompanying
notes 158-66 for a discussion of the Gertz limitation on presumed and punitive damages.
89. Greenmoss, 105 S.Ct. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Such a distinction is irreconcilable with the fundamental First Amendment principle that '[t]he inherent worth of. .
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.'" Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
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Justice Brennan maintained that the credit reporting at issue involved a matter of public concern and, therefore, deserved the Gertz protections. He suggested that the plurality had found the credit report not
to be a matter of public concern but rather a matter of economic concern.9° In rejecting this position, Justice Brennan contended that the
Court had consistently rebuffed the argument that speech concerning
economic matters deserved less first amendment protection. 9 1 He argued
that "[s]peech about commercial or economic matters.., is an important
part of our public discourse." 92 The dissent determined that Dun &
Bradstreet's credit reporting was a matter of "public concern" as that
term had been defined by the Court's precedents. 93
According to Justice Brennan, speech that is ultimately sold for
profit loses none of its constitutional protection. 4 A local company's
bankruptcy could be a matter of great concern to residents of the community because of the possible economic repercussions. 95 Because credit
reporting was a matter of public concern, the dissent argued, it "should
receive First Amendment protection from the chilling potential of unrestrained presumed and punitive damages in defamation actions." 9 6
Moreover, Justice Brennan argued that even if credit reporting was
considered a matter of purelyprivate concern, it still should have received
the first amendment protections provided by Gertz.97 Noting that even
commercial speech, which may be more closely regulated than other
98
types of speech, still receives substantial first amendment protection,
(quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)). Justice Brennan explained that
although the press was protected to ensure the vitality of first amendment guarantees, this did
not mean other speakers deserved less protection. Id. at 2958 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 50102 (1952), AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1941), Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 10103 (1940) and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231-32 & n.28 (1977)).
92. Id. at 2961 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested that the "myriad of
daily economic and social phenomenon" that surrounded people shaped their choices in the
voting booth. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

94. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976), Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959), and
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)).

95. Id. at 2961-62 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
96. Id. at 2962 (footnote omitted) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
97. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
98. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The dissent defined commercial speech as "advertisements that 'do no more than propose a commercial transaction.'" Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). The
dissent then noted that even commercial speech receives substantial first amendment protection because "'[s]o long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the alloca-
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Justice Brennan argued that credit reporting should be afforded at least

as much protection from "the chilling potential of unrestrained presumed and punitive damages awards."99
The dissent first noted that the fundamental premise of the first
amendment was that "'the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the

public.' "'I

Justice Brennan argued that, in conformity with this prem-

ise, Dun & Bradstreet's credit reports disseminated information that contributed to "private discourse essential to our well-being."'' °1
Additionally, the dissent noted that the common law of most states

recognized a qualified privilege for credit reports which typically required a showing of bad faith or malice before allowing recovery for false
and defamatory credit information. 2 Justice Brennan concluded that

recognition by the common law of the susceptibility of credit reporting to
the chill of libel should be respected. 0 3

Finally, the dissent relied on Gertz to support its assertion of full
first amendment protection for private speech. According to Justice
Brennan's interpretation of Gertz, the Gertz Court recognized that "regulatory measures that chill protected speech [must] be no broader than
necessary to serve the legitimate state interest asserted.""''
In his view,
the Gertz Court held that in defamation actions "punitive damages,
designed to chill and not to compensate, were 'wholly irrelevant' to the
furtherance of any valid state interest.'1 0 5 Justice Brennan reasoned that
tion of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic
decisions .... To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.'" Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)).
99. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,20
(1945)).
101. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In support of his position, Justice Brennan quoted Justice Douglas:
The language of the First Amendment does not except speech directed at private
economic decisionmaking. Certainly such speech could not be regarded as less important than political expression. When immersed in a free flow of commercial information, private sector decisionmaking is at least as effective an institution as are our
various governments in furthering the social interest in obtaining the best general
allocation of resources .... The financial data circulated by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
are part of the fabric of national commercial communication.
Id. at 2963 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898,
905-06 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
102. Id. at 2963 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Maurer, Common Law Defamation and the
FairCredit Reporting Act, 72 GA. L. REV. 95, 99-105 (1983)).
103. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2964 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350
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the state interest in Gertz and the case at bar were identical. In each case,
the state had an interest in compensating its citizens for damage resulting
from defamatory speech. Therefore, in Greenmoss, as in Gertz, unrestrained presumed and punitive damages provided protections broader
than necessary to serve the state interest even if the speech was simply
the equivalent of commercial speech. 10 6 The dissent concluded that allowing such damages "on less than a showing of actual malice simply
exacts too high a toll on First Amendment values."10 7
To summarize, the dissent concluded that protection of the type of
speech at issue in Greenmoss was admittedly not the central purpose of
the first amendment. Gertz, however, made clear that the first amendment required restraint on presumed and punitive damage awards even
for private commercial expression. According to Justice Brennan, all libel law implicates first amendment values to the extent that it deters true
speech which would otherwise be protected by the first amendment. The
first amendment permits restraints on speech only when they are narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate government interest. State rules
authorizing presumed and punitive damages allow juries largely uncontrolled discretion to assess damages which bear no necessary relation to
the actual harm caused. The dissent argued that the Gertz approach,
requiring at least a showing of fault and proscribing recovery of presumed and punitive damages on less than a showing of actual malice,
best accommodates the values of free speech and the states' interest in
protecting reputation.
III. THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
A.

The Common Law Background

The common law of defamation developed as both a deterrent to
attacks on personal reputation and to compensate those whose reputations had been damaged by such attacks.1 0 ' At common law, defamation
consisted of the torts of libel and slander, libel being a written defamation
(1974)). What the Gertz Court actually held was that "punitive damages are wholly irrelevant
to the state interest [compensation for injury, not punishment] that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. Justice Brennan assumed that in
private defamation cases, punishment was not a valid state interest.
106. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2964 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
107. Id. at 2965 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
108. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 771-848 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter KEETON]. For a thorough discussion of the history of the common law of defamation, see generally Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L.
REv. 546 (1903).
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and slander an oral one.' 9 For various historical reasons, different rules
developed for governing these similar areas of law. 10
Defamation is defined as a communication tending "to harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community

or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.""' At
common law, a plaintiff established a prima facie case by showing that
the defendant made a defamatory 12statement and was responsible for
communicating it to a third party.
Libel, on the other hand, was actionable per se when the defamatory
meaning of the statement was apparent on its face." 3 Slander was also
actionable per se, but only in specific instances." 4 Because of the difficulty of proving pecuniary injury, when a defamation was actionable per
se, the jury was instructed that it was to presume that actual damage
existed and to award general damages." 5 The plaintiff was not required
to introduce evidence of actual damages to recover." 6 If the defamation
was not actionable per se, the plaintiff had to prove special damages to
109. KEETON, supra note 108, at 771.
110. Veeder, supra note 108, at 547. Prior to the dawn of the printing press, early English
common law granted a remedy only for defamatory speech. In the early seventeenth century,
when the absolute monarchy in England realized the potential harm the printing press could
inflict on the crown, rather than add a cause of action for written defamation to the English
common law, Roman law was imported for use in the Star Chamber. Id.
The Star Chamber, which had almost unlimited authority, was composed of the highest
dignitaries of Church and State. The theory upon which its jurisdiction was based was that
there were certain wrongs which the ordinary courts of law could not effectively remedy and
which could not be immediately corrected by legislation. The Star Chamber was viewed as the
court of unrestrained power that was needed to carry out substantial justice. It disregarded
forms, was bound by no rules of evidence and appointed and heard only its own counsel. Id. at
562-63.
The original common-law doctrine of defamation became known as the law of spoken
defamation, or slander. The doctrine imported from Roman law and administered through the
Star Chamber became the law of written defamation, or libel. Id. at 547.
111.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
112. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer,61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (1975).
113. KEETON, supra note 108, at 795. If the statement is only defamatory when additional
facts are known, then the statement was considered libel per quod. An example of libel per
quod is a newspaper report that plaintiff had given birth to twins. The additional fact was that
she had only been married one month. Id. at 796 n.37.
114. Slanders are actionable per se only when they are: I) accusations of crime; 2) accusations that a person suffers from a loathsome disease (usually a venereal disease); 3) defamations
affecting a person's business, trade, or professional reputation; or 4) accusations of sexual unchastity or perversion. Id. at 788-93.
115. R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 346 (1980).
116. Id.
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recover."' If special damages were shown, general damages could also
be awarded.11 8
Although general damages were presumed in per se defamations,
they were still intended to be an approximate compensation to the plain-

tiff for actual injury. 119 Punitive damages, however, could be awarded to
punish the defendant and to deter future similar behavior. 2 ° Generally,
they were awarded only if the trier of fact found the defendant to be
guilty of malice in the common-law sense of reckless or careless indifference to the plaintiff's rights and feelings, or bad faith, ill will, spite, ven-

geance or bad motives. 21
To recover, the plaintiff had only to show that the defamatory statement was made.' 2 2 Proof that the statement was false was unnecessary.' 23 If the defendant could prove the statement was true, no liability
attached.1 24 Moreover, the doctrine of absolute privilege applied to
statements during judicial, legislative or other governmental proceedings,
resulting in absolute immunity from defamation liability. 25 In addition,

speakers acting to further specific interests were given qualified privileges.12 6 This 7conditional protection was lost if the privilege was abused
12
or exceeded.
Thus libels or slanders actionable per se gave rise to a presumption
117. KEETON, supra note 108, at 793-95. To prove special damages, the plaintiff generally
had to show specific evidence of pecuniary loss. Id.
118. Id. at 794. General damages were typically defined as" 'a sum which, as far as money
can do it, will compensate the plaintiffs for the injuries which have resulted directly and [are] a
natural consequence of the statements referred to in' the offending communication." R. SACK,
supra note 115, at 347 (quoting Hogan v. New York Times Co., 211 F. Supp. 99, 116 (D.
Conn. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1963)).
119. R. SACK, supra note 115, at 347.
120. Id. at 349.
121. Id. at 350.
122. KEETON, supra note 108, at 804.
123. Eaton, supra note 112, at 1353. The Supreme Court recently held that in defamation
actions brought by private figure plaintiffs against media defendants, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving the falsity of the statement. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.
Ct. 1558 (1986).
124. KEETON, supra note 108, at 839.

125. Id. at 815-24.
126. Specific interests that give rise to a qualified privilege are: 1) interest of the publisher;
2) interest of others; 3) common interest of the publisher and his audience; 4) communications
to one who may act in the public interest; 5) fair comment on matters of public concern; and
6) reports of public proceedings. Id. at 824-39.
127. A qualified privilege could be abused in various ways: the speaker might step outside
the scope of his privilege (i.e., publication to a larger audience than necessary); the speaker
might communicate the defamation maliciously (in the sense of ill will); or the speaker might
knowingly (or, in some jurisdictions, negligently) publish a falsehood. Id. at 832-35.
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of damages without proof of actual harm.128 Libels per quod129 and slanders not actionable per se required proof of special damages as a prerequisite to recovery."' 0 In these cases, once special damages were shown,
general damages could also be recovered. 13 1 In either case, when a plain12
tiff proved malice, he could also recover punitive damages.
B.

The Supreme Court Decisions

Defamation law and the first amendment collided in 1964 in the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 133 Prior to New York Times, the law of defamation had been left to
the states. One commentator has suggested that the Court's failure to
address the issue earlier reflected a recognition that the states were aware
of the constitutional concerns and were handling them adequately
through common-law rules.134 The Court finally tackled the issue in
New York Times because "the news media were in serious danger of 'running out of breath,' of becoming unduly timid in the face of unreasonable
though indirect pressures .... " 135
In New York Times, the Court for the first time held that the first
amendment limits the reach of state defamation laws. Noting that "free-

dom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amend128. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
129. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
130. See supra text accompanying note 117.
131. See supra text accompanying note 118.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
133. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan, an elected Commissioner of the City of Montgomery,
Alabama, alleged that he had been libeled by statements in a full-page ad that ran in the New
York Times on March 29, 1960. The ad, which supported non-violent civil rights demonstrations by southern black students, accused the police of, among other things, ringing the Alabama State College campus armed with shotguns and tear-gas, padlocking the students' dining
hall in an attempt to starve them into submission and arresting Dr. Martin Luther King seven
times. It was admitted that some of the statements were not accurate. Sullivan claimed that
the word "police" was a reference to him as the Montgomery Commissioner who supervised
the police department. Id. at 256-58.
134. Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-A New ConstitutionalPrivilege, 51 VA. L.
REV. 1,27 (1965). As Professor Berney points out, the New York Times Court adopted a rule
that was formulated over halfa century earlier in Coleman v. MacKlennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P.
281 (1908). Berney, supra,at 5. In Coleman, the Kansas Supreme Court argued that freedom
of the press included protection from measures used by either the judicial or executive
branches to stifle just criticism or quiet public opinion. Coleman, 78 Kan. at 719, 98 P. at 284.
Recognizing the necessity of free and general discussion of public matters to enable people to
make intelligent choices, id., the Coleman court for the first time formulated a new rule giving
a "qualified or conditional privilege for nonmalicious misstatement of fact on matters of public
interest." Berney, supra, at 9. Although the majority of states did not adopt the Coleman rule,
they did extend a qualified privilege for comment, opinion or criticism. Id.
135. Berney, supra note 134, at 23 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
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ment"' 136 and that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open," 137 the Court reasoned that the threat of civil liability
would "chill" this debate: "Whether or not a newspaper can survive a
succession of such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon
those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which
the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive."' 138 To calm this fear,
the Court held that a public official could not recover damages for defamatory falsehood "unless he proves that the statement was made with

'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reck139

less disregard of whether it was false or not."'
Once the link between defamation law and the first amendment was
established, there was no stopping the resulting chain of cases. In Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts,"4° the Court extended the New York Times stan-

dard to "public figure" plaintiffs. 4 ' In his concurring opinion, Chief
Justice Warren reasoned that public figures were on the same footing

with public officials regarding the potential chilling effect their defamation suits could have on public debate. 4 '
Four years later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 14 3 a plurality
of the Court extended the New York Times standard to defamation of
private individuals in connection with a matter of public concern. Justice
Brennan reasoned that a matter of public interest did not become less so
simply because a private individual, rather than a public official or public
figure, was involved.'" He concluded that to encourage robust debate,
the constitutional protection embodied in New York Times must be extended "to all discussion and communication involving matters of public
136. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269.
137. Id. at 270.
138. Id. at 278.
139. Id. at 279-80.
140. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Curtis was decided together with a companion case, Associated
Press v. Walker. Id. In Curtis, plaintiff was privately employed by the University of Georgia
as athletic director. Defendant, the Saturday Evening Post, published an article accusing him
of conspiring to "fix" a football game between the University of Georgia and the University of
Alabama. Id. at 135. In Walker, defendant's news dispatch described a riot that broke out
because of federal efforts to enforce a court order to enroll a black student in the University of
Mississippi. The dispatch stated that Walker, a private citizen, had taken command of the
crowd and had personally led a charge on the federal marshalls who were present to assist in
carrying out the court order. Id. at 140.
141. Id. at 155.
142. Id. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
143. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Rosenbloom, plaintiff, a magazine distributor arrested for possession of obscene literature, sued defendant radio station for referring to him as a "girlie-book
peddler" and a distributor of "smut or filth" in news stories. Id. at 32-35.
144. Id. at 43.
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or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are
famous or anonymous." 14' 5
Only three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,146 a majority of
the Court rejected the Rosenbloom plurality's extension of the New York
Times standard and again limited the actual malice rule to defamations
involving public officials and public figures. 147 The Gertz case arose
when a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot a young man and was
convicted of second degree murder. Elmer Gertz, an attorney, was retained by the victim's family to file a civil suit against Nuccio.
Robert Welch, Inc. owned a magazine that was an outlet for the
views of the John Birch Society. The magazine published an article
claiming Nuccio had been framed as part of a communist campaign
against the police. It stated Gertz had been an official of the Marxist
League for Industrial Democracy, an organization that advocated violent
overthrow of the government. It also labeled Gertz a "Leninist" and a
14 8
"Communist fronter."'
Though the Court deemed Gertz a private individual defamed by
speech involving a matter of public concern, it refused to continue to
hold plaintiffs in his position to the same standard required of public
officials and public figures.' 4 9 In rejecting the position staked out by the
Rosenbloom plurality, the Court reasoned that private individuals generally have less access to channels of effective communication than do public officials and figures, thereby reducing their opportunity to correct
false statements. Because private individuals are more vulnerable to injury, states possess a greater interest in protecting them. 5 ° The Court
also noted that unlike public officials and public figures, private individuals do not voluntarily become involved in public controversies and thus
do not "voluntarily expose[ ] themselves to increased risk of injury from
defamatory falsehood concerning them."'' Accordingly, the Court concluded private parties are more deserving of protection
and, therefore,
15 2
recovery than are public officials and public figures.
Moreover, the Gertz Court rejected the Rosenbloom " 'public or general interest' test."' 15 3 Under Rosenbloom, only private plaintiffs defamed
145. Id. at 43-44 (footnote omitted).

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Id. at 346.
Id. at 325-26.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 346.
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by speech involving a matter of public concern were required to meet the
New York Times standard. The Gertz Court repudiated this principle,
reasoning that such a test "would occasion the additional difficulty of
forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not
... ,"154 In rejecting the public interest test, the Court concluded that it
inadequately served both of the competing values at stake-the state's
interest in reputation and the constitutional protection of free speech.1 5
Although the Court overruled the extension of the New York Times
actual malice requirement to private individuals, it did restrict the common-law rights of private individuals to recover for defamation. The
Court held that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for
a publisher or broadcaster of [a] defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."' 5 6 In defense of the new rule, the Court noted that this
approach "recognize[d] the strength of the legitimate state interest in
compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet
shield[ed] the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability
for defamation [under the common-law rules]."' 5 7
Furthermore, the Gertz Court held that absent a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, states cannot permit
recovery of presumed or punitive damages; only actual injury can be
compensated.1 58 The Court stated that in allowing states to impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster of a falsehood that defamed a private party on a less demanding showing than that required by New York
Times, it recognized the strong and legitimate interest states have in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation.1 5 9 However, that
state interest extends only as far as compensation for actual injury. 6 °
The Court reasoned that when injury is presumed from the fact of publication alone,1 61 thus permitting damage awards for injury to reputation
without proof of the injury, there is an increased likelihood that the
154. Id.
155. Id. The test inadequately serves the interests the first amendment was meant to protect because a potential defamation defendant cannot predict what a court will find to be a
matter of public or general interest. This unpredictability deters free speech because the
speaker may prefer to remain silent rather than speak and risk having a court find the matter
not to be of public or general interest.
156. Id. at 347.
157. Id. at 347-48.
158. Id. at 349.
159. Id. at 348-49.
160. Id. at 349.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
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threat of defamation actions will inhibit first amendment freedoms. 62
Additionally, allowing juries to presume damages invites the punishment
of unpopular opinions. 163 The Court concluded that absent a showing of
actual malice, plaintiffs can only be compensated for actual injury.' 64

The Court did not, however, limit actual injury to out-of-pocket expenses. Rather it included "impairment of reputation and standing in
the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
165
suffering."
In proscribing the award of punitive damages absent a showing of
actual malice, the Court reasoned that, as with presumed damages, jury
discretion to award punitive damages contributed unnecessarily to the
danger of media self-censorship. However, unlike presumed damages,
punitives were "wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifie[d] a
negligence standard for private defamation actions.' 66 Therefore, the
state interest was outweighed by first amendment concerns and a showing of actual malice as a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages was
justified.
By requiring some fault on the part of the defendant in private defamation actions and limiting the award of presumed and punitive damages
to cases where actual malice was shown, the Gertz decision cut deeply
into state defamation law.' 6 The decision also left state courts in disagreement regarding when the Gertz limitations on presumed and punitive
damages apply. Some state courts concluded the limitations only applied
when private figures sued media defendants16 8 while others concluded
they applied to all private figure suits regardless of the status of the defendant.' 69 After ten years of uncertainty, the Court finally addressed
the defamation issue again in Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.;170 the results were less than satisfying.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Greenmoss plurality held the Gertz limitations on recovery of
presumed and punitive damages inapplicable to Greenmoss Builders because the two cases were distinguishable-one involved a matter of pub162. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
163. Id.
164. Id.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 349-50.
Id. at 350.
See supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Id.
105 S.Ct. 2939 (1985).
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lie concern and the other did not. The following analysis will
demonstrate that the Court failed to distinguish the two cases. In addition, though the plurality did not address the Gertz fault requirement, an
argument will be made that under the Court's reasoning, after Greenmoss, fault on the part of the defendant is not a prerequisite to recovery
in defamation actions not involving a matter of public concern.
A.

The Problem with the Plurality'sApproach

The Greenmoss plurality argued that its decision not to apply the
Gertz standard to Greenmoss Builders was consistent with Gertz because
the defamatory statement in Gertz involved a matter of public concern
while the statement in Greenmoss did not.17 ' Though that factual distinction exists, it should be irrelevant for purposes of first amendment
analysis. The rules formulated in Gertz respecting defamations against
private individuals' 7 2 were not based on the type of speech involved. In
fact, the Gertz Court rejected the use of a public interest test to determine
the applicability of the New York Times standard to private individuals. 7 3 Instead, it set forth new damage guidelines in the area of defamation of private individuals as an accommodation between the right of the
individual to recover for wrongful injury and the need to protect free
debate from the chilling effect of state libel law.' 7 4
The Greenmoss plurality opinion began, "In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., we held that the First Amendment restricted the damages that a
private individual could obtain from a publisher for a libel that involved
'
a matter of public concern." 175
That is not what the Gertz Court held.
What the Gertz Court did in fact hold was (1) "so long as they do not
impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual" '7 6 and (2) "States may
not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages [in defamations of
private individuals], at least when liability is not based on a showing of
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."' 7 7 In so hold171. See supra text accompanying notes 40-53.

172. See supra text accompanying notes 156-66.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.

174. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-50 (1974).
175. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2941 (1985)
(citation omitted).
176. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57 for the Gertz
Court's reasoning.
177. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. See supra text accompanying notes 156-66 for the Gertz
Court's reasoning.
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ing, the Gertz Court gave more protections to plaintiffs without subjecting defendants to strict liability. Whether the defamatory statement
involved a matter of public concern was not an issue. Although critical,
the Greenmoss plurality ignored this portion of the Gertz holding.
The Gertz Court specifically rejected the public concern test that the
Greenmoss plurality revived without comment. Having lived with the
test since it was announced four years previously in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,17 the Gertz Court decided it was too nebulous a formulation on which to determine the applicability of the New York Times
standard to private individuals, a standard which usually barred
recovery:
The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge [the] legitimate state interest
[in enforcing a legal remedy for defamation of private individuals] to a degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges
to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues
of "general or public interest" and which do not-to determine
. . "what
'
information is relevant to self-government." We
doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of
judges.... The "public or general interest" ... inadequately
serves both of the competing values at stake. On the one hand,
a private individual whose reputation is injured by defamatory
falsehood that does concern an issue of public or general interest has no recourse unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of New York Times.... On the other hand, a publisher
or broadcaster of a defamatory error which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or general interest may be held liable
in damages even if it took every reasonable precaution to ensure
the accuracy of its assertions. And liability may far exceed
compensation for any actual injury to the plaintiff, for the jury
may be permitted to presume damages without proof of loss
79
and even to award punitive damages.'
178. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.
179. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (citations omitted) (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). The plurality's inaccurate recitation of the
Gertz holding did not escape the attention of the dissent:

One searches Gertz in vain for a single word to support the proposition that
limits on presumed and punitive damages obtained only when speech involved matters of public concern. Gertz could not have been grounded in such a premise. Distrust of placing in the courts the power to decide what speech was of public concern
was precisely the rationale Gertz offered for rejecting the Rosenbloom plurality
approach.
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Thus, the Gertz Court deemed the matter of public concern test an inadequate basis upon which to extend the harsh New York Times requirements to private defamation suits. Instead, defamation actions by private
individuals would accommodate the first amendment through the appli180
cation of special principles.
The Greenmoss plurality exhumed the matter of public concern test
without acknowledging it had ever been buried. It employed the test as a
threshold which must be reached before requiring private defamation
plaintiffs to prove actual malice to recover presumed and punitive damages. If a particular court decides the defamatory statement did not involve a matter of public concern, the first amendment does not become
an issue and the case then turns on state libel law. In effect, Greenmoss
carved out an exception to the reach of the Constitution based on a nebu18 1
lous public concern trigger.
Disregarding the Gertz rejection of the public concern test, the
Greenmoss plurality argued that in private defamation cases, only speech
involving a matter of public concern should receive constitutional protection. Ironically, Justice Powell relied on the Gertz decision to support his
contention by misreading that holding. In his view, the Gertz Court held
that "the fact that expression concerned a public issue did not by itself
entitle the libel defendant to the constitutional protections of New York
Times."1 82 The fact that it was a public issue had to be weighed against
the type of plaintiff to determine if the New York Times protections were
appropriate. When the plaintiff was a public official or public figure,
these protections for defendants were appropriate because of the limited
state interest involved. When the plaintiff was a private person, the state
interest increased, requiring a different set of protections. 183 "Nothing in
our opinion," Justice Powell concluded, "indicated that this same balance would be struck regardless of the type of speech involved."1'84
What Justice Powell failed to recognize was that the Gertz Court did
not consider the type of speech involved as part of the balancing formula
for determining the applicability of New York Times. Rather, the Court
focused only on the type of plaintiff. 8 5 The interest of the state, and
Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2959 n. 11(Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 156-66.
181. The Gertz fault requirement may still apply to cases like Greenmoss. For an argument
that it does not, see infra text accompanying notes 193-98.
182. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2944.

183. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343, 348-49 (1974)). See supra
text accompanying notes 150-52 for the Gertz Court's reasoning.
184. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2944 (footnote omitted).
185. The Gertz Court described the balance as follows:
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therefore the balance, changed only when the status of the plaintiff
changed, not the classification of speech. Justice Powell's injection of the
type of speech into the balancing formula was not supported by the holding in Gertz.
Nevertheless, reasoning that the balance would be different when
speech did not involve a matter of public concern, the Greenmoss plurality argued that "speech on matters of purely private concern is of less
First Amendment concern.... [T]he role of the Constitution in regulating state libel law is far more limited when the concerns that activated
New York Times and Gertz are absent." '86 The plurality failed to point
out, however, that the concerns that activated New York Times were different from those that activated Gertz. New York Times was triggered by
a concern that state libel law was having a chilling effect on the debate of
public issues.' 87 Gertz was triggered by a concern that the application of
the New York Times standard to private individuals failed to adequately
take into account their reputational interests.1 88 While a matter of public
concern was peripherally involved in Gertz, the real concern was an imbalance between first amendment protection and reputational interest in
defamation of private individuals. Thus, whether an alleged defamation
involves a matter of public concern should not be an issue in applying the
Gertz requirements.
If expanding democratic dialogue by eliminating self-censorship is
the goal of granting first amendment protection to potential defamation
defendants, a quantum of predictability about when that protection applies is essential. According to the plurality, in cases where speech does
not involve a matter of public concern "'[there is no threat to the free
The New York Times standard defines the level of constitutional protection appropriate to the context of defamation of a public person.... This standard administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self-censorship of the
common-law rule of strict liability for libel and slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly many deserving
plaintiffs ... will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test.
Despite this substantial abridgement of the state law right to compensation for
wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the Court has concluded that the protection of the
New York Times privilege should be available to publishers and broadcasters of defamatory falsehood concerning public officials and public figures.... [W]e believe
that the New York Times rule states an accommodation between [the interest of the
media in immunity from liability] and the limited state interest present in the context
of libel actions brought by public persons .... [Tihe state interest in compensating
injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule should
obtain with respect to them.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-43.
186. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2946 (footnote omitted) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 146-47 (1983)).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 146-66.
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and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with
a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is
no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-censorship by the
press.' "189 The problem, of course, is the one recognized by the Court in
Gertz. If speech involving a matter of public concern strikes the balance
in favor of constitutional protection and it is not clear what constitutes a
matter of public concern, potential defamation defendants will not know
when they will receive the Gertz protections. As one commentator has
persuasively argued:
[T]he news media ought not to be put to the task of assessing
whether a court would ultimately find its [allegedly defamatory
statement] to be in the public interest or of private interest....
[T]he difficulty of making such a determination would cause
the media to steer wide of the unlawful zone, resulting in self[I]n order to
censorship of matters in the public interest ....
ensure that state law does not suppress information concerning
matters of public interest, it is necessary to provide constitutional protection for information containing defamatory falsehoods which are of no public interest at all. 190
The same considerations apply to potential defamation defendants
not in the news media. 19 1 For who is to say what is a matter of public
concern?
"[O]ur cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matterto take a non-exhaustive list of labels-is not entitled to full
First Amendment protection." The breadth of this protection
evinces recognition that freedom of expression is not only essential to check tyranny and foster self-government but also intrinsic to individual liberty and dignity and instrumental in
society's search for truth.'9 2
189. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2946 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 366, 568 P.2d 1359, 1363 (1977)).
190. Eaton, supra note 112, at 1415 n.264.
191. One question that the Greenmoss decision did seem to answer is whether non-media
defendants are entitled to the New York Times and Gertz protections. Five justices (White,
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens) said that they are. See supra text accompanying
notes 69-71 & 89. For a persuasive discussion of why non-media defendants should be protected, see Watkins & Schwartz, Gertz and the Common Law of Defamation: Of Fault,
Nonmedia Defendants, and ConditionalPrivileges, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 823, 831-63 (1984).
192. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2960-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977)). For an extensive list of cases finding "public interest"
in a wide variety of human affairs, see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 377 n.10 (White, J., dissenting) and
Comment, The Expanding ConstitutionalProtectionfor the News Mediafrom Liabilityfor Def-
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Because there will never be agreement on all the various types of
speech that merit first amendment protection, this element should be

abandoned for purposes of a constitutional analysis. Rather than eliminating this arbitrary element, the Greenmoss decision, with its unpredictable matter of public concern test, undermines the goal of eliminating

self-censorship. It forces courts to decide on an ad hoc basis when to
apply the protections of Gertz. Ironically, the Court granted certiorari in
the Greenmoss case because the state courts were in disagreement about
when to apply the Gertz protections; yet more uncertainty is sure to follow from the Court's decision.

.

The Fault Requirement

Although the plurality did not specifically address the issue, it is
arguable1 93 that after Greenmoss the Gertz fault requirement 194 no longer
applies to defamations of private individuals not deemed to involve a
matter of public concern.195 The reasoning the plurality adopts to allow
amation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1547, 1560-62 nn.94-96
(1972).
193. In his concurring opinion, Justice White argued: "Although Justice Powell speaks
only of the inapplicability of the Gertz rule with respect to presumed and punitive damages, it
must be that the Gertz requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also
inapplicable in cases such as this." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 2939, 2953 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57.
195. Perhaps the plurality concluded it need not address the fault requirement in the Greenmoss case because, regardless of the Court's decision, whether defendant Dun & Bradstreet
had been at fault would not be an issue. The Greenmoss facts strongly indicate that Dun &
Bradstreet's error in reporting the bankruptcy constituted negligence:
The trial established that the error in [Dun & Bradstreet's] report had been caused
when one of its employees, a seventeen year old high school student paid to review
Vermont bankruptcy pleadings, had inadvertently attributed to [Greenmoss Builders] a bankruptcy petition filed by one of [Greenmoss Builders'] former employees.
Although [Dun & Bradstreet's] representative testified that it was routine practice to
check the accuracy of such reports with the businesses themselves, it did not try to
verify the information about [Greenmoss Builders] before reporting it.
Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2942. If the Greenmoss Court had found Gertz applicable to the case,
Greenmoss would have to prove actual malice on the part of Dun & Bradstreet to recover
presumed and punitive damages. The Gertz fault requirement would have already been met.
However, if Gertz was found inapplicable to the case, Dun & Bradstreet's liability would turn
on the common law. Thus, it would be held strictly liable; fault would be irrelevant.
Had Dun & Bradstreet not been negligent in distributing the report without verification,
perhaps the plurality would have addressed the fault requirement because it would have made
a difference on retrial. If Gertz was found applicable, naturally the fault requirement would
have to be met. However, if Gertz was found inapplicable, the Court would have had to specifically address whether fault is an element in defamation cases governed by the common law. If
it is, Dun & Bradstreet would not be held strictly liable and fault would become an issue.
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recovery of presumed and punitive damages without a showing of actual
malice in such cases is just as applicable to the fault requirement.
In support of its argument for allowing the recovery of presumed
and punitive damages in cases not involving a matter of public concern,
the plurality employed a balancing test. It argued that in cases involving
a matter of public concern, "the state interest in awarding presumed and
punitive damages [is] not 'substantial' in view of their effect on speech at
the core of First Amendment concern. This interest, however, is 'substantial' relative to the incidental effect these remedies may have on
speech of significantly less constitutional interest. 196 Because in defamation cases "'proof of actual harm will be impossible... where, from the
character of the defamatory words and circumstances of publication, it is
all but certain that serious harm has resulted in fact,' "197 the plurality
concluded that the state interest in compensating defamation plaintiffs in
such cases outweighs the limited constitutional interest.
The same reasoning can be applied to eliminate the fault requirement articulated in Gertz.198 Since the plurality argued that in cases not
involving a matter of public concern the state interest becomes more substantial relative to the constitutional concerns involved, it is consistent to
argue that in such cases, potential defamation defendants need no shield
from the rigors of strict liability. If matters not of public concern are
worthy of only limited constitutional protection, imposing a strict liability standard should pose no danger to robust democratic dialogue.
Therefore, requiring some fault on the part of the defendant as required
by Gertz would be unnecessary; speech of such limited importance does
not need that safeguard.
196. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2946 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349).
197. Id. (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 765 (4th ed. 1971)).
198. The Gertz Court held that state courts could no longer hold defamers of private individuals liable because a fault requirement "provides a more equitable boundary between the
competing concerns involved .... It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in
compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields [potential defamation defendants] from the rigors of strict liability for defamation." Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974). The Gertz Court recognized that this new rule allowed the
imposition of liability in defamation suits by private individuals on a less demanding standard
than New York Times. It reached this conclusion, however, "not based on a belief that the
considerations which prompted the adoption of the New York Times privilege for defamation
of public officials and . . public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of private
individuals," id. at 348, but because it recognized a "strong and legitimate interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation." Id. at 348-49.
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PROPOSAL

Status of Plaintiffs

The protections given defamation defendants should not be based on
the status of the plaintiff. Such distinctions hinder, rather than aid, democratic dialogue. The first amendment protection of freedom of expression on public issues was created "'to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.' "199 The Supreme Court thrust the Constitution into defamation
law to ensure that "debate on public issues ... be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open. '"2" But it is unrealistic to conclude that the only speech
that fits into this category is speech about public officials or figures:
Social sciences literature suggests that an individual's attitude
toward political issues is formed . . . by communications in
family groups, social groups, work groups, and peer groups in
general.... [A] back-fence discussion among neighbors, a businessman's speech to a group of graduate students, a conversation over lunch, or letters to a state official may well play.., an
important role in contributing to democratic dialogue.2 0 '
Moreover, the first amendment is concerned with things other than
20 2
self-government:
While purely political speech undoubtedly lies at the core of the
first amendment, speech that would not necessarily bear that
label carries considerable societal value and is clearly worthy of
first amendment protection .......
[I]ndividuals ... need
information about other individuals with whom they interact
on a regular basis-the neighbor whose mysterious late-night
meetings have attracted unsavory characters to the quiet residential area, the person who applies for a job, or the new babysitter who is to take care of the kids. In short, there are a
variety of occasions when one individual needs to examine the
reputation of another, yet the clear message of the common law
of strict liability to those giving the information is "don't."2 3
As the constitutional law of defamation now stands, defamers of
public officials 2° and public figures20 5 are given more protection than
199. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
200. Id. at 270.
201. Watkins & Schwartz, supra note 191, at 850 (footnotes omitted).
202. Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 891, 901 n.34 (1984).
203. Watkins & Schwartz, supra note 191, at 854-55 (footnotes omitted).
204. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), the Court defined a public official as follows:
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necessary to protect the first amendment concerns involved and defamers
of private individuals are not given enough. To begin to resolve this discrepancy, all plaintiffs should be treated alike. The determination of liability and damages should not be based on the status of the plaintiff.
The Gertz Court offered two reasons for the disparate treatment of

public and private plaintiffs. First, public plaintiffs are supposed to be in
a better position to rebut the defamatory statement, thereby minimizing
the reputational damage:

Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and
[T]he "public official" designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.
... Where a position in government has such apparent importance that the
public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees ... the New York Times malice standards
apply.
Id. at 85-86 (footnotes omitted). As will be discussed, this statement does not provide a clear
separation between public officials and those who would only be considered public employees
for New York Times purposes.
205. The Gertz Court defined a public figure as follows:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly,
those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The Court has developed two subcategories of this classification-the general public figure and the special public figure. General
public figures are those whose fame precedes them; those of whom the jury has probably heard
prior to the litigation. Id. at 352. Special public figures cannot achieve that status by involvement in public events alone; they must voluntarily enter a public debate "in order to influence
the resolution of [public] issues." Id. at 345.
There are problems with both categories. Plaintiffs are placed in the general public figure
group. simply because of their fame. It has been questioned why the constitutional law of libel
should treat Michael Jackson, Reggie Jackson and Leonard Bernstein the same as Dan Rather,
William F. Buckley, Jr., Jerry Falwell and Lee Iacocca. Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 905, 908, 916 (1984). Though they have all achieved "pervasive fame or notoriety," Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351, they do not all "occupy positions of... persuasive power and
influence." Id. at 345. Therefore, they do not lie at the heart of New York Times. Ashdown,
Of PublicFigures and Public Interest-The Libel Law Conundrum, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
937, 942 (1984).
The difficulty with the special public figure category, where one's status is achieved by
voluntary injection into a public debate to influence the outcome, is that first it must be determined what is a public debate. Judges are asked to decide if "a controversy is 'public,' a
determination indistinguishable ... from whether the subject matter is of public or general
concern," a decision the Rosenbloom plurality was reluctant to leave to judges. L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 644 (1978) (footnote omitted).

For a more thorough discussion of the problems involving public figure status, see generally Ashdown, supra, and Schauer, supra.
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hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state
interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.2 °6
Even the Gertz Court itself recognized the weakness of this argument:
Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo
harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation
is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with
a lie. But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to our inquiry. 0 7
In addition, as one commentator has pointed out:
Even if a rebuttal reaches the entire audience which read or
heard the defamatory charge, readers and listeners may accept
the rebuttal as little more than a self-serving denial and discount it. A rebuttal is thus likely to have no effect at all in
mitigating the injury to the defamed individual.2 08
Thus, the opportunity for rebuttal is an inadequate reason for distinguishing between plaintiffs.
The second reason the Gertz Court gave for the distinction between
public and private plaintiffs was an assumption of the risk theory:
[P]ublic officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with
respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public of'2 9
fice or assumed an "influential role in ordering society.
This assumption is not necessarily correct. Because the Court's definition of public official is unclear,2 1 it is difficult for an individual to assume the risk of public status, not knowing whether such status has been
achieved. "While presidents, governors, and most elected officials and
candidates for elective office are public officials, just 'how far down into
the ranks of government employees the "public official" designation
206. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (footnote omitted).

207. Id. at n.9. Justice White reiterates this sentiment in his Greenmoss concurring opinion:
"'[I]t is the rare case where the denial overtakes the original charge. Denials, retractions, and
corrections are not 'hot' news, and rarely receive the prominence of the original story.'" Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2950-51 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring) (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971)).
208. Eaton, supra note 112, at 1420.
209. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164
(1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)).
210. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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would extend' is unsettled.""' The lower courts have routinely found
"all government employees, no matter how inferior their positions, and
some persons and entities not employed by a government at all ... [to be]
public officials within the meaning of New York Times."2" 2 It would be
incredulous to argue that everyone who works for the government has
voluntarily assumed the "increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them." ' 3
The Court is on slightly stronger ground when it argues that public
figures have assumed the risk of defamatory injury. Recent decisions by
the Court have stressed the importance that a public figure become one
voluntarily.2" 4 Therefore, unlike some government employees deemed
public officials, the risk assumed by a public figure should be a knowing
one. However, rather than encouraging discussion of public issues, this
rule hampers it by discouraging those who might otherwise become involved from doing so for fear of uncompensated injury to their
reputation.
Another justification for the public/private distinction was proferred by Justice Brennan in the Greenmoss dissent: "Speech allegedly defaming a private person will generally be far less likely to implicate
matters of public importance than will speech allegedly defaming public
officials or public figures." 2' 15 As Justice Brennan noted, the alternative
to deciding what is in the public interest on a case by case basis would be
very costly. 21 6 However, it is impossible to predict the type of speech
that will be involved based on the status of the plaintiff. Admittedly,
deciding on an ad hoc basis what involves a matter of public concern is
an undesirable approach because of the cost and unpredictability.2" 7
However, completely eliminating speech directed toward private individuals from receiving the equivalent protection given speech directed toward public plaintiffs simply because of their status is not the answer.
There is too great a risk that speech which should be protected will be
chilled. If wide-open debate is the goal, it is better to protect some
211. Comment, The Constitutional Law of Defamation: Are All Speakers Protected
Equally?, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 157 (1983) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966)).
212. Eaton, supra note 112, at 1376-77.
213. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
214. See Comment, supra note 211, at 160. But see Ashdown, supra note 205, at 941 n.30
for a sampling of the many lower courts that have not followed this narrow restriction on the
definition of public figure.
215. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2957 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. See supra text accompanying note 179.
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speech that should not be protected than to leave speech that deserves
first amendment protection unprotected.
The reasons for distinguishing between public and private plaintiffs
are unpersuasive. Moreover, the legitimate goal of predictability argues
in favor of treating all defamation plaintiffs alike. The first amendment
21 8
limits the reach of libel law to prevent a chill on wide-open debate.
While there are many plaintiffs, such as President Reagan or Johnny
Carson, whose status is quite clear, there are many others for whom the
line between public official/private individual or public figure/private individual is not so easily drawn.2 19 If a plaintiff's status is unpredictable
and a potential defamation defendant's liability depends on that status,
the speaker will probably avoid making the statement and steer clear of
potential liability rather than risk an unfavorable determination by a
2 20

court.

By proposing that all defamation plaintiffs be treated alike, this
Note does not suggest that they all be held to the New York Times standard. Instead, this Note proposes all plaintiffs be held to the following
standard of liability and damages.
B.

Liability

To best accommodate the conflicting state and first amendment interests in defamation cases, adherence to a closely linked system of liability and damages is required. As to liability, all defamation defendants
should be held to a negligence standard. 22 1 As Justice Harlan has said:
[I]t does no violence... to the value of freedom of speech and
press to impose a duty of reasonable care upon those who
would exercise these freedoms. I do not think it can be gainsaid
that the States have a substantial interest in encouraging speakers to carefully seek the truth before they communicate, as well
as in compensating persons actually harmed by false descriptions of their personal behavior. Additionally, the burden of
acting reasonably in taking action that may produce adverse
consequences for others is one generally placed upon all in our
society. Thus, history itself belies the argument that a speaker
218. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
219. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
220. See supra text accompanying note 190.
221. As of 1984, nearly half of the states had defined the standard of liability to be applied
in libel cases brought by private individuals. Of those, most have adopted a negligence standard. Cohen, Libel State Court Approaches in Developing a Post-GertzStandardof Liability,
ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 155, 155 (1984).
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must somehow be freed of the ordinary constraints of acting
with reasonable care in order to contribute to the public good
while, for example, doctors, accountants, and architects have
constantly performed within such bounds.2 22
By applying a negligence standard, potential defamation defendants
would be encouraged to use reasonable care before making their statements. Knowing that they will be held to this standard if sued, they can
maintain adequate records to protect themselves. If they do not act reasonably, then they should be held accountable for the injury they cause.
Although this standard will be more easily overcome by plaintiffs than

the New York Times standard and, therefore, defendants will more frequently be found liable, plaintiffs are more deserving of compensation
when injured by unreasonable behavior.
Additionally, because under a negligence standard potential defamation plaintiffs will know they will not be subjected to the ominous New

York Times standard to recover, they will be encouraged to participate in
robust debate. Though by doing so they will put themselves at greater

risk of becoming targets of defamatory falsehoods, they will have a reasonable expectation of compensation for injury.
Concededly, it is entirely possible under this standard that a defamatory statement that is indeed false will have been made nonnegligently,
and the plaintiff will not be able to recover.22 3 In that situation, the
plaintiff should be entitled to a judicial judgment that the statement is
false so that his or her reputation will at least be vindicated.2 24
222. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 70 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
223. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 392 (White, J., dissenting).
224. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2952 (White, J., concurring). Accord Freund, PoliticalLibel
and Obscenity, 42 F.R.D. 491, 497 (1966) (Address delivered to the Judicial Conference of the
Third Circuit). See also Eaton, supra note 112, at 1431-32. This could be accomplished
through the requirement of a special verdict such as that used in Ariel Sharon's suit against
Time magazine. Sharon v. Time, Inc., No. 85-7029 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Courts file). Sharon, a public official held to the New York Times standard, lost the
suit because he was unable to show actual malice on the part of Time. However, the jury also
found that the statement made by Time was false. Although Sharon was awarded nothing, he
still claimed victory stating, "I came here to prove that Time lied; we were able to prove that
Time did lie." McGrath & Stadtman, Absence of Malice, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1985, at 52.
The idea of vindication in libel suits has not escaped the attention of Rep. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., at least in the context of public officials suing news organizations. His bill, H.R.
2846, now before the House Judiciary Committee, would allow public officials to seek a declaratory judgment that they were portrayed in a false and defamatory light. The officials would
have to prove the statement was false but would not be required to prove malice. Because of
the reduced burden, there would be no award of damages. The winning plaintiff would, however, collect attorneys' fees. In this way, public officials who felt wronged by the media could
have the satisfaction of clearing their names. H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See
Wolf, Libel Suits, 72 A.B.A. J. May 1, 1986, at 32.
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Damages

Since it will be easier for plaintiffs to recover under a negligence
standard, it is important that damages be limited to protect first amendment concerns. As Justice White noted in Greenmoss, "[iln New York
Times, instead of escalating the plaintiff's burden of proof to an almost
impossible level, we could have achieved our stated goal by limiting the
recoverable damages to a level that would not unduly threaten the
press.1

22 5

1. Compensatory damages
Damages have traditionally been presumed in defamation law because of the difficulty in proving injury to reputation. 2 6 However, they
were still intended to be an approximate compensation for actual injury.2" 7 Unfortunately, "jury estimates of that injury are often based
more on the wealth of the defendant and unpopularity of the speech at
issue than on any perception of the actual harm done to the plaintiff
often resulting in 'gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of
any actual injury.' ",228 For that reason, the Gertz Court limited the recovery of compensatory damages to actual injury when a private plaintiff
failed to prove actual malice.2 29
A modified version of the Gertz compensation for actual injury standard should be retained for all plaintiffs upon proving the defendant's
negligence. As discussed above, the Gertz Court held that actual injury
"is not limited to out-of-pocket loss ' ' 23° but can "include impairment of
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and
mental anguish and suffering." '3 1 Since injury to reputation is the essence of a defamation action,23 2 a defamation plaintiff should first be required to prove impairment of reputation before being allowed to recover
actual damages.2 33 Then, actual damages should be limited to impairment of reputation and standing in the community, the injury defama225. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2952 (White, J., concurring).

226. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
227. R. SACK, supra note 115, at 346.
228. Eaton, supra note 112, at 1433 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,

349 (1974)).
229. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50. See supra text accompanying notes 158-65.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
Id.
F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 181 (15th ed. 1951).
As has always been the case, a defendant should be allowed to introduce evidence of

the plaintiff's bad reputation to mitigate damages. W.

KEETON,

supra. note 108, at 847-48.
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tion law is meant to redress. 234
Without question, these types of injuries will often be difficult to
prove and some plaintiffs will not be fully compensated for their reputational injuries. Moreover, defamation plaintiffs will not be compensated
for their non-reputational injuries. But some meaningful limitation must
be put on the recovery of damages to accommodate the first amendment.
If recovery is allowed for personal humiliation and mental suffering,
there is too great a risk of high damage awards bearing no relation to
actual harm. The possibility of these high awards is what chills free
speech. It is also essential that jury awards for actual injury be reviewable by appellate courts to ensure the amount is not excessive for the
injury or punishment disguised as compensation.
2.

Punitive damages

Historically, punitive damages in defamation law have made courts
and commentators uneasy because they represent punishment of expression. Punitive damages are intended to punish the defendant and deter
similar behavior in the future. Consequently, "they constitute a device
peculiarly suited to use by courts or juries to avenge or attempt to silence
unpopular speakers or communications."2'3 5 On the other hand, because
of the difficulty of proving actual injury in this area, punitive damages
are sometimes the only method of dealing with the willful character
assassin.236
Currently, if a defamation plaintiff must overcome a defendant's
constitutional privilege, either under the New York Times or Gertz "actual malice" standard, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth must be shown to recover punitive damages.2 37 This is to be distinguished from the circumstances under which punitive damages are normally awarded-when the defendant is found guilty of common-law
malice in the sense of "reckless or careless indifference to the plaintiff's
rights and feelings, or bad faith, ill will, spite, vengeance or bad
'238
motives.
The two malice standards are easily confused by courts. 239 How234. See Eaton, supra note 112, at 1438-39 for a variation of this proposal.
235. R. SACK, supra note 115, at 349 (footnote omitted).
236. Id. at 350.
237. See supra text accompanying note 166.
238. R. SACK, supra note 115, at 350 (footnote omitted).
239. The jury instruction given in the Greenmoss case itself is a good example:
If you find that the Defendant acted in a [sic] bad faith towards the Plaintiff in publishing the Erroneous Report, or that defendant intended to injure the Plaintiff in its
business, or that it acted in a willful, wanton Br reckless disregard of the rights and
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ever, the standard chosen is very important in determining whether the
plaintiff recovers. The award of punitive damages under the commonlaw malice standard is commonplace. 240 Conversely, because the plaintiff must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence,2 4' recovery has been foreclosed in nearly all defamation cases in which the
constitutional standard has been applied.2 42
It would be desirable to eliminate this confusion in terms yet continue to make it difficult for plaintiffs to recover punitive damages in defamation cases except under the most egregious circumstances.
Otherwise, the risk of punishing and deterring unpopular speakers is too
great.2 43 To accomplish this, defamation plaintiffs should only be able to
recover punitive damages when they can prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant's sole motivation in publishing the defamatory statement was to maliciously injure the plaintiff. Even if the statement was published for malicious reasons, if the defendant can show any
other reason for the publication, the plaintiff will not meet its burden.
While this will make it very difficult for the plaintiff to recover punitive
damages, it will also make it more likely that a speaker will only be punished for intentionally hurting the plaintiff rather than expressing an unpopular view.
Using this standard for recovery of punitive damages in defamation
cases will eliminate the confusion between actual malice and commonlaw malice. Additionally, this limitation would make recovery for punitive damages both less likely and more predictable. As a result, the
threat of punitive damages will be far less likely to unnecessarily inhibit
democratic dialogue.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Rather than resolving the questions left open in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,2' the decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
interests of the Plaintiff, the Defendant has acted maliciously and the privilege is
destroyed. Further,if the Report was made with reckless disregard of the possible
consequences, or if it was made with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of its truth or falsity, it was made with malice.
Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2943 n.3 (citation omitted) (emphasis added by the Supreme Court),
See also Eaton, supra note 112, at 1370.
240. R. SACK, supra note 115, at 350.
241. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964). See also Eaton, supra
note 112, at 1374.
242. Eaton, supra note 112, at 1375.
243. See supra text accompanying note 235.
244. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Gertz decision left the state courts in disagreement about
when to apply its protections. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
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Builders, Inc.,245 created new ones. The Greenmoss decision resurrected
the nebulous matter of public concern test for determining the applicability of the Gertz requirements to defamations against private individuals.
It also left unclear whether the Gertz fault requirement would apply
when a court determined the speech did not involve a matter of public
concern. Lower courts are sure to resolve these problems differently, further confusing an area of the law that is desperately in need of
simplification.
This Note proposes a comprehensive simplification of the first
amendment standards applied to defamation. First, the type of speech
involved in the defamation would be irrelevant in determining the standard to be applied because what involves a matter of public concern, and
thus deserves first amendment protection, is unpredictable. Second, a
negligence standard of liability should be applied coupled with limitations on recoverable damages. With liability limited to actual damages
and punitive damages awarded only in egregious cases, there will be an
adequate balance between free speech concerns and reputation. Potential
defamers will be encouraged to be careful and the damages will be kept in
line with the actual harm, thus minimizing the chilling effect of potential
defamation liability.
Laura L. Saadeh

245. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).

